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[Comments
Slamming the Door in the Consumer's Face:
Courts' Inadequate Enforcement of TILA




Do you remember not remembering the word foreclosure? The late
1990s to early 2000s was certainly a wonderful time to be a homeowner.I
Everyone and their neighbor 2 seemed flush, and few envisioned the
debilitating darkness at the end of the tunnel.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University; B.S. Business, 2002, Virginia Tech. I would like to thank Kim and my
parents for their ongoing support, and Prof. M. Christine Fotopulos who taught me the
importance of brevity and clarity in writing. Any errors are, of course, my own.
1. See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE
SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON WEALTH, PROPERTY VALUES AND
TAX REVENUES, AND How WE GOT HERE 2 (Comm. Print 2007), available at
http://jec.senate.gov (follow "Reports" hyperlink, then search for Report title) (stating
that between 1997 and 2006, U.S. home prices increased by over 80 percent).
2. This phrase calls to mind Harry S. Truman's quip "it's a recession when your
neighbor loses his job; it's a depression when you lose yours." Sayings of the Week, THE
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Since late 2005, the residential real estate market has been
progressively deteriorating.3 Homeowners in some areas have watched
the value of their homes drop to less than half of what they paid only five
years ago.4 Meanwhile, the clock has struck midnight on all those
adjustable rate mortgages that had two-to-five-year teaser rates. And the
mortgage brokers who manufactured all those dreams of homeownership
are of no help-most are either out of business 6 or unwilling to refinance
without proof of significant cash reserves.7 All of this has come together
to create one of the worst home foreclosure crises in U.S. history.
The economic and social costs associated with home foreclosures
are numerous.9 Widespread foreclosures tend to have a devastating
effect on home values,' 0 which in turn negatively impacts the national
economy as a whole."1 On a more individual level, a home foreclosure is
an involuntary removal of a person's shelter, and can equate to
homelessness for an entire family.12 The Truth-In-Lending Act ("TILA"
or "the Act") has proven to be one way that federal law addresses the
incidence of home foreclosures.13
OBSERVER (London), Apr. 13, 1958, at 6. But the witty remark seems far less humorous
in today's tumultuous economy.
3. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 1, at 2; see
generally Current Trends in Foreclosure and What More Can Be Done to Prevent Them:
Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., Illth Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Foreclosure
Prevention Hearings], available at http://jec.senate.gov (follow "Hearings" hyperlink,
then search for Hearing title) (statement of Dr. William Shear, Director, Financial
Markets & Community Investment, GAO).
4. See, e.g., David Streitfeld & Jack Healy, Phoenix Leads the Way Down in Home
Prices, Falling 50% From a June 2006 Peak, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at B 1.
5. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 1, at 2.
6. ROBERT B. AVERY ET AL., The 2008 HMDA Data: The Mortgage Market During
a Turbulent Year, 95 Federal Reserve Bulletin, at 27-28 n.48 (2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/pdf/hmdaO8draft2.pdf.
7. See id. at 3.
8. See, e.g., Foreclosure Prevention Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Dr.
Susan M. Wachter, Professor of Financial Management, The Wharton School) ("[T]he
foreclosure rate is . . . the highest it has ever been since the Great Depression."); CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, 11ITH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION
1, 5 (Comm. Print 2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-030609-
report.pdf (stating that foreclosure rates are three times their historic rates, and that as of
2008, approximately I in 10 residential homeowners were either facing foreclosure or
had fallen behind on their mortgage payments).
9. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 8, at 9-11.
10. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT EcoN. COMM., supra note 1, at 7-9.
11. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
12. See, e.g., Donna St. George, The $698,000 Mistake, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Nov. 27, 2009, at Al (discussing the story of a single mother and her three children who
were forced to seek refuge at a homeless shelter after their home was lost to foreclosure).
13. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (2006). Although the statute
itself provides the basic letter of TILA, much of TILA law is found in Regulation Z. See
generally 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (2009). Regulation Z is a set of rules that was promulgated
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TILA was enacted by Congress in 1968 as a means of ensuring that
individuals could make informed choices about consumer loans. 14 One
of the ways Congress added bite to TILA was through the extended right
of rescission provision.15 Under this provision, a consumer who has not
been provided certain statutorily-required loan disclosures may rescind a
home refinance loan for up to three years from the consummation of the
loan, and is entitled to be refunded all interest payments and finance
charges that were paid on the loan. 16  TILA was written as a strict
liability statute,17 so if a lender fails to provide even one required
disclosure to a borrower, the Act dictates that the loan is rescindable at
the borrower's option.'8
Because TILA gives a borrower three years to cancel a loan for a
lender's disclosure violations, borrowers may choose to invoke the
extended right of rescission when facing home foreclosure.' 9 Indeed,
TILA's extended right of rescission provision has become known among
consumer advocates as a "defense to foreclosure." 2 0 The prophylactic
effect of TILA's extended right of rescission for borrowers facing
foreclosure is just another example of the importance Congress placed on
by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) at the request of Congress to "effectuate the
purposes" of TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). Regulation Z has been considered to be
virtually binding law since at least the Supreme Court's statement that Regulation Z is
"dispositive" in interpreting TILA unless the interpretation would be "demonstrably
irrational." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); ELIZABETH RENUART ET AL., TRUTH IN LENDING 1-3
(6th ed. 2007). This treatise will be frequently cited for background material throughout
this Comment, as it is considered to be one of the leading sources for current TILA
interpretation and law, and has been cited in numerous court opinions and law review
articles. See, e.g., Muro v. Target Corp., 250 F.R.D. 350, 354-55 (N.D. 111. 2007). The
book's authors have also produced a number of scholarly articles on the topic of TILA.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and
Nothing But the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG.
181 (2008).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(a)(3), 226.23(a)(3).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1).
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1).
19. See, e.g., Randall v. Bank One Nat'l Assoc. (In re Randall), 358 B.R. 145,
158 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) ("A mortgage foreclosure action is dependent upon the
existence of a valid mortgage . . . [and rescission] under section 1635 of TILA has the
effect of invalidating the mortgage."); see also Elwin Griffith, Truth in Lending-The
Right of Rescission, Disclosure of the Finance Charge, and Itemization of the Amount
Financed in Closed-End Transactions, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 216-17 (1998).
20. See, e.g., RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 383, 479; cf THE PA. BAR INST., THE
FEDERAL & PENNSYLVANIA RESPONSE TO THE CREDIT CRISIS, 315-16 (THE PA. BAR INsT.
2009) (indicating that borrowers' use of TLA-based counterclaims to challenge
foreclosure actions is an effective defense to foreclosure).
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"protect[ing] the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit ...
practices." 21
Despite the plain language and clear purpose of TILA, over the
years many courts have effectively abrogated some of the Act's
consumer protections. Specifically, a number of courts have deemed
TILA's extended right of rescission to impose an overly harsh effect on
lenders.2 2  In response, these courts apply a less-than-strict liability
standard to lenders' disclosure violations. 23 As a result, consumers are
finding it far more difficult to invoke TILA's extended right of
rescission, which can effectively leave borrowers powerless against a
statutorily-culpable lender's foreclosure proceedings.24
This Comment will discuss courts' use of a less-than-strict liability
enforcement standard for TILA disclosure violations associated with
home refinance loans, whether this standard is appropriate based on
various considerations, and how this enforcement standard affects the
efficacy of the extended right of rescission as a defense to foreclosure.
Part II of this Comment will begin by discussing TILA's extended right
of rescission, its practical mechanics, and its goal of returning the
borrower and lender to the status quo ante. Part III will discuss the
relatively recent trend among courts applying a less-than-strict liability
enforcement standard to TILA disclosure violations, and will explain
why this is the wrong approach from a historical, practical, and policy
standpoint. Part IV will conclude by summarizing the reasons why
courts should apply a strict liability enforcement standard to TILA
disclosure violations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose of TILA
The primary purpose of TILA is to require lenders to provide
prospective borrowers with a uniform disclosure of the true cost and
terms associated with a loan so that borrowers can make informed credit
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); cf 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i); (identifying specific "[r]escission
rights in foreclosure"); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(h) (identifying specific "[s]pecial rules for
foreclosures").
22. See generally infra Part III. This Comment focuses on the way courts handle
TILA rescission claims, and obviously assumes a jurisdiction that utilizes judicial
foreclosure.
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part Ill.E.1.
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decisions.2 5 Prior to the enactment of TILA, creditors used various
means of calculating interest rates and disclosing contractual terms for
consumer loans.26 As a result, prospective borrowers were unable to
truly compare the cost and terms of different loans from different
lenders.27 Congress hoped that TILA would provide consumers with a
28clear apples-to-apples comparison of different loan options.
B. Lender Requirements
The precise requirements of TILA vary depending on what type of
loan is being considered. Home refinance loans fall under the category
commonly known as "closed-end" credit transactions.29 TILA and its
regulatory counterpart, Regulation Z,30  identify certain "material
disclosures"31 that a borrower must receive in connection with a
mortgage refinancing. The lender's failure to satisfy these disclosure
requirements will trigger a borrower's right to rescind the loan.32
C. Right of Rescission
TILA gives a borrower the right to rescind a loan only if certain
criteria are met. First, the loan must be deemed a consumer credit
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b); see generally Mourning v. Family
Publ'n Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 360-70 (1973) (discussing the purpose of TILA);
RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 1-3.
26. Griffith, supra note 19, at 192. Professor Griffith has written a number of other
scholarly articles on historical and modern TWA jurisprudence. See, e.g., Elwin Griffith,
Lenders and Consumers Continue the Search for the Truth in Lending under the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z, 44 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 611 (2007).
27. Griffith, supra note 19, at 192; cf Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin 444 U.S.
555, 559, (1980) (stating that TILA's goal of promoting "the informed use of credit" by
consumers is a difficult task due to the "complexity and variety" of credit transactions).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); Thomka v. A. Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 248 (3d
Cir. 1980); Griffith, supra note 19, at 192; see also Mourning, 411 U.S. at 377 ("The
Truth in Lending Act reflects a transition in congressional policy from a philosophy of
'Let the buyer beware' to one of 'Let the seller disclose.' By erecting a barrier between
the seller and the prospective purchaser in the form of hard facts, Congress expressly
sought 'to . .. avoid the uninformed use of credit."') (citations omitted).
29. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a). Technically, "closed-end" is the term used in
Regulation Z. TILA uses the phrase "transactions under an other than open end credit
plan." Compare 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10), with 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a). These descriptions
refer to a fixed term loan that does not involve an open line of credit or allow for
"repeated transactions." See 15 U.S.C. § 1638(i); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10).
30. See supra note 13.
31. The material disclosures include the loan's annual percentage rate (APR),
finance charge, amount financed, payment schedule, the total of the payments, and a few
other disclosures and limitations referenced in other portions of the Act and Regulation Z.
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) n.48.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(a)(3), 226.23(a)(3).
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transaction. Second, the loan must create a security interest in the
borrower's principal dwelling.3 4 Finally, the loan cannot be for the
construction or purchase of a home;35 rather, the loan must be either a
loan refinance, or a similar non-purchase loan or line of credit.36 Thus,
borrowers who refinance their home's mortgage with a new lender have
a right to rescind the loan under TILA.
The provisions of TILA allow a borrower to rescind a home
refinance loan38 for any reason during the first three days after the loan is
consummated, as is frequently provided for in consumer contracts.39
Additionally, a borrower may rescind the loan for up to three years from
the loan's consummation date if the borrower did not receive both a copy
of all the required material disclosures and two copies of a notice
identifying the borrower's right to rescind the loan. 4 0 The extended right
of rescission will only terminate upon the occurrence of one of the
following events: (1) the sale of the home securing the refinance loan;
(2) the borrower's transfer of all interest in the home; (3) the lender's
eventual delivery to the borrower of any previously undelivered material
disclosures or copies of the Notice of Right to Rescind; or (4) the three-
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). A "consumer credit transaction" is defined as a transaction
in which credit is "offered or extended to a natural person . . . for personal, family, or
household purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(e)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(1). Both the Act and Regulation
exempt the right of rescission for a "residential mortgage transaction," which is defined
as a transaction in which a mortgage, deed of trust, or equivalent security agreement is
"created or retained against the consumer's dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial
construction of such dwelling." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (emphasis added).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(1); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1638(e)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(2); cf 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, 23(f)(4) (Official
Staff Commentary) (stating that the right of rescission is only applicable to loan
refinancings with the original creditor for the portion of the refinancing that is a new
advancement of money).
37. See Griffith, supra note 19, at 205-06.
38. For the remainder of this Comment, the terms "loan," "borrower," and "lender"
will be in reference to a rescindable home refinance loan unless otherwise indicated.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
40. Id. (identifying the three year extended right of rescission); 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.23(a)(3) n.48 (explaining that the lender's failure to deliver to the borrower the
notices of right to rescind or material disclosures will trigger the three year extended right
of rescission); 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(b) (noting that two copies of the notice of right to
rescind must be delivered to the borrower); 15 U.S.C. § 1602(u); 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a)
n.36 (identifying which disclosures are "material disclosures"); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp.
1, 15(b)(l)-1 to 5, 23(b)(1)-1 to 5 (Official Staff Commentary) (detailing the requirements
for proper delivery of the notices of right to rescind). For the remainder of this
Comment, the term "Notice of Right to Rescind" will be used to describe the disclosure
form that explains the borrower's rescission rights, as required by section 226.15(b) of
Regulation Z.
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year anniversary of the consummation of the refinance loan. 41 Thus, if
the lender fails to deliver4 2 to the borrower even one of the material
disclosures or copies of the Notice of Right to Rescind, then the
borrower has three full years to rescind the loan, assuming the borrower
does not sell or otherwise transfer interest in the home.
D. Strict Liability Enforcement
The consumer-friendly nature of the extended right of rescission
was originally bolstered by the fact that TILA was designed to be a strict
liability statute. 43  Numerous courts have held that minor, technical
violations of TILA's disclosure requirements are grounds for rescission,
even if the violation played no role in the borrower's decision to
consummate the loan,44 the borrower suffered no financial harm, 4 5 or the
borrower could not have even understood the disclosure due to a lack of
English proficiency.46 This rigorous application of TILA's statutory
requirements reflects Congress's decision to impose liability on "any
creditor who fails to comply with any [disclosure] requirement." 4 7
Although the text, history, and purpose of TILA indicate that the Act is a
strict liability statute,48 some courts have gradually been requiring more
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § § 226.15(a)(3), 226.23(a)(3).
42. The failure to deliver a material disclosure should not be confused with TILA's
requirement that disclosures be made "clearly and conspicuously." 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a);
12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a). Courts have interpreted TILA's clear and conspicuous
requirement to mean that the disclosures must be objectively understandable "from the
vantage point of a hypothetical average consumer." Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465
F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2006). But a lender's failure to disclose materials clearly and
conspicuously does not necessarily equate to a failure to disclose altogether. Malfa v.
Household Bank, F.S.B., 825 F.Supp. 1018, 1020-21 (S.D. Fla. 1993). This distinction is
important because a lender's failure to disclose clearly and conspicuously may entitle a
borrower to damages, whereas a lender's failure to make a material disclosure entitles a
borrower to rescind the loan. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1), and 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a),
with 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3), and 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). But see Handy v. Anchor
Mortgage Corp., 464 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the borrower's receipt of two
slightly different versions of the Notice of Right to Rescind failed to satisfy the clear and
conspicuous requirement of TILA, and thus entitled the borrower to exercise the
extended right of rescission).
43. See, e.g., Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 506 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir.
2007); see generally RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 534-37 (explaining that recent
amendments to TILA reemphasize Congress's intent to make so-called technical
violations of the Act grounds for a borrower to exercise the right of rescission).
44. See, e.g., Hamm, 506 F.3d at 529; Briscoe v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No.
08 C 1279, 2008 WL 4852977, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
45. See, e.g., Brown v. Marquette Say. and Loan Ass'n, 686 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir.
1982).
46. Zamarippa v. Cy's Car Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877, 879 (1 Ith Cir. 1982).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (emphasis added).
48. See infra Parts III.B and III.D.
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than so-called "technical violations" before permitting a borrower to
invoke the extended right of rescission. 4 9 As discussed later, a court's
decision to apply a less-than-strict liability standard to TILA's disclosure
requirements can place an undue burden on a borrower facing
foreclosure who wishes to exercise the extended right of rescission.50
E. Mechanics of Rescission
A borrower who exercises" the right to rescind a loan will set into
play a three-step process defined by TILA and Regulation Z. 52 First, the
security interest in the borrower's home is automatically voided and the
borrower is no longer liable to make further payments toward the loan.
Second, the creditor has twenty days to refund the borrower any
payments the borrower has paid in connection with the loan, and to
reflect the termination of the security interest.54 Third, upon the
creditor's compliance with the second step, the borrower must tender
back to the creditor the original loan proceeds. 5  The goal of this three
step process is to return both the borrower and the lender to the status
56quo ante-the parties' positions prior to the loan transaction.
49. See infra Part III.A.
50. See infra Part III.E.
51. To exercise the right of rescission, a borrower must notify the creditor in writing.
12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(a)(3), 226.23(a)(3) (2009).
52. For a detailed discussion of each of the three steps, see RENUART ET AL., supra
note 14, at 435-52.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(1), 226.23(d)(1); 12 C.F.R.
Pt. 226, Supp. I, 15(d)(1)-1 (Official Staff Commentary) ("Any security interest giving
rise to the right of rescission becomes void when the consumer exercises the right of
rescission . . . [and] is automatically negated regardless of. . . whether or not it was
recorded or perfected.").
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(2), 226.23(d)(2). The creditor is
obligated to refund the borrower any amounts paid by the borrower in connection with
the rescinded loan, whether they were paid to the creditor or a third party; refunds will
include any monthly payments, finance charges, brokers' fees, title search or appraisal
fees, and the like. 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, 15(d)(2)-1 (Official Staff Commentary).
The creditor is also obligated to begin taking steps to reflect the termination of the
security interest, such as cancelling the documents that created the lien on the home, and
filing release or termination documents in the county courthouse or other place of public
record. 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, 15(d)(2)-3 (Official Staff Commentary).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(3), 226.23(d)(3).
56. See Handy v. Anchor Mortgage Corp., 464 F.3d 760, 765-66, (7th Cir. 2006)
(citing Barrett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 445 F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir. 2006));
Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 597 F.Supp.2d 612, 617 (E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting
McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 2007)); see
also 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, 23(f)(4) (Official Staff Commentary) (stating that the
reason that a creditor must return to the borrower all monies paid by the borrower is
because "the consumer must be placed in the same position as he or she was in prior to
entering into the new credit transaction").
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Although this three-step process is clearly laid out in the Act and
Regulation Z, courts do have a limited right to modify the second and
third steps. 7 But the extent to which courts may modify these rights is
debatable, and can have a dramatic effect on a borrower's ability to
exercise the right of rescission as a defense to foreclosure. 8
F. A Defense to Foreclosure
TILA's extended right of rescission can be an excellent tool for
borrowers facing foreclosure. When a borrower properly exercises the
right of rescission, the creditor's security interest is automatically
voided. 59  The creditor cannot foreclose because there is nothing to
foreclose on.60 Instead, the formerly secured creditor becomes a mere
unsecured creditor with limited remedies against the borrower's
default.6 1 Thus, the borrower's rescission has the effect of halting the
creditor's foreclosure proceedings.62 Additionally, recent TILA
amendments reflect Congress's intent to make the extended right of
rescission available as a defense to foreclosure.63
In 1995, Congress amended portions of TILA that affect the
64extended right of rescission. In one amendment, Congress modified
certain provisions of TILA to make the lender's disclosure requirements
stricter when a borrower is facing foreclosure than when a borrower is
not.65 For example, Congress allows certain tolerances for a lender's
disclosure errors.66 Under normal circumstances a lender can
underestimate the finance charge, a material disclosure, by $100 and still
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(4), 226.23(d)(4); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226,
Supp. I, 15(d)(4)-1 (Official Staff Commentary) ("The procedures outlined in
§ 226.23(d)(2) and (3) may be modified by a court.").
58. See infra Part III.E.l.
59. See supra Part II.E.
60. Griffith, supra note 19, at 216; see RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 480.
61. RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 480; see also In re Piercy, 18 B.R. 1004, 1007
(Bankr. Ky. 1982) (discussing the likelihood that once the debtor rescinds under TILA,
and the security interest is voided, the debtor's subsequent obligation to tender back the
loan proceeds would be "discharge[able] in bankruptcy"). But see American Mortg.
Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 820-21 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that "it was not
the intent of Congress to reduce the mortgage company to an unsecured creditor" through
the use of the right of rescission); see also infra Part III.C.2 (discussing courts'
imposition of conditional rescission).
62. Of course, a court's decision to exercise its equitable powers can have a
significant impact on the effectiveness of the extended right of rescission as a defense to
foreclosure. See infra Part III.C.2.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(1) (2006).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (Supp. 11995) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1994)).
65. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1605(f) (2006), with 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i) (Supp. 11995).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(f) (2006).
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be considered in compliance with the Act's disclosure requirements.67
But if the borrower is facing foreclosure, then the Act only permits a
lender to underestimate the finance charge by $35. As a result, a lender
who has initiated foreclosure proceedings against a borrower is held to a
higher standard for compliance with the disclosure requirements, and can
be deemed non-compliant for even minor errors. The obvious effect is
that a borrower can invoke the extended right of rescission more easily
when facing foreclosure proceedings.
Congress's targeted decision to tighten TILA's already strict
standards in the foreclosure context suggests that Congress intended to
provide full access to the extended right of rescission to borrowers facing
foreclosure. 69 Additionally, the mere fact that Congress has carved out
an entire provision titled "[r]escission rights in foreclosure" in addition to
the standard rescission provisions, at least signifies congressional
awareness of the importance of the extended right of rescission provision
for borrowers facing foreclosure. 70 Nevertheless, borrowers are finding
it more difficult than ever to receive the statutory benefits of the
extended right of rescission when facing foreclosure.
III. DISCUSSION
TILA has traditionally been considered a strict liability statute.
Early TILA cases followed the letter of the Act,71 and many recent cases
have continued to enforce the increasingly strict, technical, post-1995-
amendment requirements of TILA.72 Nevertheless, some courts apply a
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(f)(1)(A).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(2).
69. See Griffith, supra note 19, at 216-17; see also RENUART ET AL., supra note 14,
at 383 ("The TIL[A] rescission provisions reflect Congress's desire to keep homeowners
from placing their homes in jeopardy without a clear understanding of the risks and
benefits of the transaction").
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(1) (stating that the rescission rights available to a
borrower facing foreclosure are "in addition to any other right of rescission available
under this section").
71. See, e.g., Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506, 510-11, (5th Cir. 1976)
("[O]nce the court finds a [TILA] violation, no matter how technical, it has no discretion
with respect to the imposition of liability."); Thomka v. A. Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d
246, 248 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Enforcement [of TILA] is achieved in part by a system of strict
liability in favor of consumers.").
72. See, e.g., Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 506 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2007).
In Hamm, the lender provided a disclosure form to the borrower which stated that the
borrower's amortized loan payments would consist of 359 payments of $541.92
beginning on 03/01/2002, with a final payment of $536.01 due on 02/01/2032. Id. at 527.
The court held that this was a rescindable violation because the disclosure did not
explicitly state that the borrower would be required to make 360 monthly payments over
thirty years, with payments due at the beginning of each month. Id. at 530. The court
recognized that the borrower was not likely misled by the disclosure, but reasoned that
under TILA, "the borrower should not have to make any assumptions." Id. at 531. The
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less-than-strict liability standard to certain TILA violations, including
certain disclosure violations that would trigger the extended right of
rescission.73
The courts applying this standard believe that the extended right of
rescission imposes an overly harsh and inequitable result on lenders;
thus, they conclude that the provision should only be used in certain
limited circumstances.74 As discussed below, these courts are
misapplying TILA law by misconstruing the purpose of the Act's 1995
amendments,75 overlooking the various built-in statutory protections for
lenders, and ignoring the underlying policy goals of the Act. The
application of a less-than-strict liability standard to TILA disclosure
violations creates a potentially insurmountable barrier to borrowers who
wish to invoke the extended right of rescission as a defense to
foreclosure.78 This result violates both the letter and spirit of TILA.
This discussion will begin by comparing two Circuits' differing
approaches to common, technical TILA violations. The comparison of
these two cases will illustrate the opposing views of the appropriate
enforcement standard for TILA disclosure violations.
A. Highly Technical TILA Violations: A Case Comparison
Lenders' violations of TILA's more specific, technical requirements
can provide an excellent illustration of the different ways courts enforce
the Act. The circuits are split as to how strictly to enforce the
requirements associated with the Notice of Right to Rescind, a mandated
disclosure that has some highly technical requirements that can easily
trip up an unwary lender. 7 9 Recall that every borrower must receive two
identical copies of the Notice of Right to Rescind.80 The purpose of this
Hamm decision came out of the Seventh Circuit, which arguably applies the strictest
enforcement standards to TILA violations. See, e.g., id; Handy v. Anchor Mortgage
Corp., 464 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2006). See Part III.A.1 for a detailed discussion of Handy.
For a more extensive listing of courts that continue to apply a strict liability standard to
TILA violations, see RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 535 n.457 (listing cases from the
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as dozens of District Court
cases, in which the courts emphasized the strict liability nature of TILA in assessing
violations).
73. See, e.g., Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 312-13 (1st Cir. 2009);
Santos-Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 485 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2007).
74. See infra Part IILA-B.
75. See infra Part II.B.
76. See infra Part III.C.
77. See infra Part III.D.
78. See infra Part III.E.
79. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(b)(l)-(5) (2009) (listing the required elements of a
proper Notice of Right to Rescind disclosure).
80. See generally supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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disclosure, among other things, is to inform borrowers of their right to
rescind the loan, how that right may be exercised, and when the right will
81
expire.
Because the requirements for the Notice of Right to Rescind are so
specific, even a lender committed to compliance can commit a serious
violation. For example, a lender is permitted to use boilerplate notice
forms that have blank spaces where the date of the transaction and
expiration date of the right of rescission can be inserted.82 But in the
lender's rush to finalize loan documents, two slightly different versions
of the model notice form might be given to the borrower, the expiration
date of the right of rescission might not get filled in, or the lender might
commit some other violation. Nevertheless, Regulation Z states that a
lender's failure to satisfy the specific requirements for the Notice of
Right to Rescind will entitle the borrower to the three-year extended
83 t
right of rescission. Despite the seemingly plain language of Regulation
Z, the First and Seventh Circuits have applied completely different
enforcement standards to technical violations related to the Notice of
Right to Rescind.
In the First Circuit case, Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corporation,84 the
lender for a home refinance loan provided the borrower with copies of
the Notice of Right to Rescind at the loan closing.85  Approximately
twenty months later, the borrower sought to exercise the extended right
of rescission based on the lender's failure to identify the date of the
transaction and the expiration date of the right of rescission on the
notice. 86 In rejecting the borrower's attempt to rescind the loan, the court
81. 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(b).
82. A lender is permitted and encouraged to use model forms provided in the
Appendix of Regulation Z which have blank spaces where the appropriate dates can be
inserted by the lender. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(2). The model forms are provided "to
help creditors comply with TILA ... Handy v. Anchor Mortgage Corp., 464 F.3d 760,
763 (7th Cir. 2006).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a)(3), 226.23(a)(3) ("The consumer may exercise the right to
rescind until . . . delivery of the notice required by [this section] . . . [and] the right to
rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation.") (footnotes omitted). See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.15(b), 226.23(b)(l)-(2) (identifying the Regulation's requirements for the Notice
of Right to Rescind, including the requirement that the Notice "clearly and conspicuously
disclose . . . [t]he date the rescission period expires").
84. Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 568 F.3d 309 (1st Cir. 2009).
85. Id. at 310.
86. Id. In Melfi, the lender's Notice of Right to Rescind stated:
You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, without cost,
within THREE BUSINESS DAYS from whichever of the following events
occurs LAST:
(1) The date of the transaction, which is _; or
(2) The date you receive your Truth in Lending disclosures; or
(3) The date you received this notice of your right to cancel.
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noted that "technical deficiencies do not matter if the borrower receives a
notice that effectively gives him notice" of the required dates.8 The
court interpreted TILA's clear and conspicuous requirement to be
satisfied when a court deems the disclosure to be objectively
understandable. 8  The court concluded that this borrower surely knew
the date he closed on the loan, thus excusing the lender's failure to
include the date of the loan closing on the notice, and that "[fJrom that
date, it is easy enough to count three days," thus satisfying the lender's
failure to include the expiration date of the borrower's right of
rescission.89 Accordingly, the court affirmed the District Court's
decision90 that the lender's "technical violations" of TILA did not permit
the borrower to exercise the extended right of rescission to rescind the
loan.9 1
Conversely, in the Seventh Circuit case, Handy v. Anchor Mortgage
Corporation,92 the court applied a very different enforcement standard
for a technical TILA violation. 93 In Handy, the borrower sought to
rescind her loan two years after the loan consummation based on the
lender's failure to provide the proper version of the model Notice of
Right to Rescind form.94 The lender had provided a total of five copies
of the notice to the borrower. 9 5 But only one copy was the particular
model form that was to be used for this borrower's transaction type-a
refinance with a new lender.96 The other four copies were model forms
that were to be used for refinances with the original lender. 97 The court
conceded that the language of the five forms was so similar that the
If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send the notice no later than
MIDNIGHT of _(or MIDNIGHT of the THIRD BUSINESS DAY
following the latest of the three events listed above).
Id. at 311 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the lender had stamped the date of
the transaction at the top of the Notice, but that the spaces shown above where dates
could be inserted for the date of the transaction and the recession deadline were left
blank. Id.
87. Id. at 312.
88. Id. ("Our test is whether any reasonable person, in reading the form provided in
this case, would so understand it.").
89. Id. at 311.
90. Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp., No. 08-024ML, 2009 WL 64338 (D.R.I. Jan. 9,
2009).
91. Melfi, 568 F.3d at 311-13.
92. Handy v. Anchor Mortgage Corp., 464 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2006).
93. The court noted that "TILA does not easily forgive technical errors" and that
"hypertechnicality reigns in TILA cases." Id. at 764 (citing Cowen v. Bank United of
Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 761-62.
95. Id. at 762.
96. Id. at 762-64.
97. Id.
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borrower was not likely confused as to her rescission rights.98
Nevertheless, the court held that a lender's failure to provide the precise
type of model notice form is a violation that is sufficient to trigger a
borrower's extended right of rescission.9 9 The court reasoned that
whether a disclosure is clear and conspicuous for purposes of TILA
"depends on the contents of the form, not on how it affects any particular
reader." 00
On the surface, this split in authority seems to stem from the
definition of TILA's "clear and conspicuous" requirement for
disclosures.' 0' The Melfi court stated that the sufficiency of a disclosure
should be considered from an objective standpoint-that is, whether a
reasonable person would be misled by the language of the disclosure.'0 2
On the other hand, the Handy court noted that whether a borrower could
have been confused by a disclosure "misses the point" of the specific
requirements provided by TILA.'03
Part of the reason courts like Melfi are comfortable ignoring certain
TILA violations is based on these courts' interpretation of the language
and purpose of the 1995 amendments to TILA. Thus, an examination of
the language and congressional intent behind these amendments will
shed some light on which court's approach is the better one.
B. Guidance from the 1995 Amendments
In 1995, Congress amended various portions of TILA including
certain disclosure requirements and the extended right of rescission
provision.104  These amendments were meant to serve a number of
98. Id.
99. Id. at 764-65.
100. Id. at 764 (quoting Smith v. Check-N-Go of Ill., Inc., 200 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir.
1999)).
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(3) (2009).
102. Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 312 (1st Cir. 2009). For a case
that is a bit more factually similar to Handy, but adopts the "objectively reasonable"
standard for disclosure sufficiency, see Santos-Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 485
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2007). In Santos-Rodriguez, the lender had provided the borrowers with
the wrong version of a Notice of Right to Rescind form, whereas in Handy, the lender
provided both proper and improper versions of the model form to the plaintiffs. Compare
Handy, 464 F.3d at 764, with Santos-Rodriguez, 485 F.3d at 16. In rejecting the Handy
court's reasoning for allowing the borrowers to rescind the loan, the Santos-Rodriguez
court reasoned that just because Regulation Z identifies the applicable model form for a
particular transaction that "could be used in such a transaction does not mean that use of
that form is required. " Santos-Rodriguez, 485 F.3d at 18 n.7 (emphasis in original).
103. Handy, 464 F.3d at 764.
104. See The Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109
Stat. 271 (1995). See Part II.F for a more detailed discussion of some of the 1995
amendments' key changes to TILA and specifically to the extended right of rescission
provisions.
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purposes, but two primary objectives were to clarify TILA's disclosure
requirements and to respond to a controversial Eleventh Circuit case.105
The 1994 case of Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co. o0 "triggered a firestorm"
within the lending industry and served as a "political hot button" that
greatly motivated Congress's decision to amend TILA.107
In Rodash, the borrower had obtained a home equity mortgage from
AIB Mortgage Company. 08  The lender provided a TILA disclosure
statement to the borrower, but failed to include $226 worth of settlement
fees and taxes under the "finance charge" figure as required by TILA.' 09
Instead, the lender improperly included these amounts in the mutually
exclusive "amount financed" itemization.'' 0 As a result, the borrower
invoked her extended right of rescission approximately five months after
the loan was consummated."' The court held that the lender's error was
within the scope of TILA's prohibitions that allow a borrower to exercise
the extended right of rescission." 2
After the Rodash decision was announced, dozens of class action
lawsuits were filed in which thousands of plaintiffs sought to rescind
their mortgages for TILA violations that were considered by some to be
"mere technical errors."" 3  In response to this avalanche of mortgage
rescissions, representatives from the lending industry appeared before
Congress to testify that these class action suits "threatened the solvency
of the industry."' 14 This threat of "wholesale rescissions" prompted
Congress to quickly enact a moratorium on any class action lawsuits that
sought relief for certain TILA violations. 5 Then, in 1995, Congress
chose to amend TILA in several ways.
Although Congress made various amendments to TILA in 1995,
two are most relevant for this discussion. First, Congress granted lenders
retroactive relief from the types of minor finance charge violations that
105. See generally 141 CONG. REC. S5614-02, (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1995), available at
1995 WL 236489; accord McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418,
424 (1st Cir. 2007); RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 8-9 (discussing the 1995
amendments and congressional intent behind the amendments).
106. Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994).
107. RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 8.
108. Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1143.
109. Id. at 1147.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1144.
112. Id. at 1148-49.
113. McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 424 (1st Cir. 2007);
see 141 CONG. REc. S5614-02, (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1995), available at 1995 WL 236489;
RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 8-9.
114. RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 9 (citations omitted); see Griffith, supra note
19, at 195.
115. See Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, § 1,
109 Stat. 161 (1995); McKenna, 475 F.3d at 424.
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were present in Rodash.16 Second, Congress adjusted the tolerances for
TILA disclosure violations and provided the ultra-low tolerance level for
TILA violations suffered by borrowers facing foreclosure."' 7  These
amendments were meant to not only allay the lending industry's fears of
the potential crushing liability that might result from widespread TILA
class action suits, but also to give lenders more leeway for disclosure
violations that Congress viewed as "honest mistakes" by lenders." 8
This historical backdrop has prompted some courts to apply a less-
than-strict liability standard to TILA disclosure violations.l19 In support
of this standard, the Melfi court stated in a cursory manner that pre-1995
amendment cases that applied a strict liability standard to TILA
violations "were decided under an earlier version of TILA."l 20 The court
went on to say that the 1995 amendments have "perhaps weakened the
present force of older case law," although the court never actually
addressed the precise implications of the 1995 amendments on prior case
law.12' This reasoning is troubling because the 1995 amendments did not
broadly eliminate existing TILA requirements, but rather, they merely
increased the statutory tolerances for certain lender disclosure errors and
granted retroactive immunity for certain lender disclosure violations.122
Although the 1995 amendments had the effect of benefitting the
lending industry by lessening the risk of lender liability, the reach of
these lender-friendly alterations was limited to specific, narrowly-defined
areas. Nothing in the 1995 amendments suggests that courts have the
right to deem clearly defined TILA disclosure violations as too minor or
technical to be actionable.12 3 In fact, a court's decision to ignore a TILA
disclosure violation when a borrower is facing foreclosure would
contradict another underlying theme of the 1995 amendments: the
special attention and ultra-low disclosure tolerances afforded borrowers
facing foreclosure.12 4  Courts like the Me/li court appear to be
supplanting Congress's decision to narrowly address the risk of
widespread class action rescission lawsuits with some supposed intent to
soften the entire Act.
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006); Barry v. Mortgage Servicing Acquisition Corp.,
941 F.Supp. 278, 283-84 (D.R.I. 1996); RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 9.
117. See supra Part II.F.
118. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 424-25.
119. See, e.g., id. at 418.
120. Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 313 (1st Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
122. RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 13.
123. See Brown v. Credithrift of Am. Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Brown), 106 B.R.
852, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) ("These amendments were apparently all that were
considered necessary by Congress to remedy any inequities in favor of consumers arising
from litigation under the TWA as originally enacted.").
124. See supra Part II.F.
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Courts should not overlook the fact that the 1995 amendments were
meant to address the specific fear that washed ashore in the wake of
Rodash-the risk of crushing liability from TILA class action lawsuits.125
Courts applying a less-than-strict liability standard recognize that TILA
no longer appears to provide a clear avenue for class action lawsuits
seeking class-wide loan rescissions,126 and that plaintiffs must now
individually pursue the "highly personal" rescission remedy. 127
Nevertheless, these courts continue to rely on the 1995 amendments as a
means of empowering themselves to pick-and-choose which TILA
violations they deem to be legally sufficient. This approach ignores the
underlying purpose of the 1995 amendments.
As one court noted, "[i]t is nose-on-the-face plain that unrestricted
class action availability for rescission claims" would pose an excessive
risk for the lending industry considering the highly technical nature of
TILA's disclosure requirements and the powerful effect of the extended
right of rescission.12 8 But this is not to say that the same risk is present
simply because individual borrowers still have the right to invoke the
extended right of rescission for an individual, statutorily-defined
violation of TILA. If this were the case, Congress would likely have
either dramatically reduced the disclosure requirements for lenders or
deleted the extended right of rescission altogether when it enacted the
1995 amendments in response to the Rodash decision. Yet Congress did
not choose to eliminate the technical nature of TILA's disclosure
requirements; it simply gave lenders a bit more leeway with certain
disclosure mandates.129  Nor did Congress choose to eliminate the
extended right of rescission from the Act; in fact, it highlighted the
importance of this remedy for borrowers facing foreclosure.' 30 Courts
should realize that the impact of the 1995 amendments was limited to
specific areas, and that "it is incumbent upon courts to preserve the
concept which has been well-established since the enactment" of TILA
by offering consumers the "full remedies" of TILA, even for so-called
technical violations.' 3 '
125. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
126. McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 423, 425 (1st Cir.
2007). The statute permits class action lawsuits for certain violations, but places a cap on
damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2006). However, precisely which types of
class action lawsuits may be brought under TILA is debatable. See Andrews v. Chevy
Chase Bank, FSB, 474 F.Supp.2d 1006, 1007-08 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (discussing the
availability of TILA class action suits to plaintiffs).
127. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 423-26.
128. Id. at 424.
129. See generally supra note 116 and accompanying text.
130. See supra Part I.F. and text accompanying note 117.
131. Brown v. Credithrift of Am. Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Brown), 106 B.R. 852,
853 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
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C. TILA's Built-In Lender Protections
The courts that fear that the extended right of rescission can have an
overly harsh effect on the lending industry, often overlook some of
TILA's built-in lender protections. There are at least two significant
ways in which the Act provides protections to lenders from the possible
inequities associated with the extended right of rescission: (1) lenders'
statutory defenses to disclosure violations; and (2) courts' statutory
authority to utilize conditional rescission. Both of these protections
mitigate the potentially harsh effect that can result from the combination
of the Act's highly technical requirements and the powerful remedy of
rescission.
1. Lender Defenses
TILA provides a number of defenses to lenders who have
committed a disclosure violation,132 but one defense is specifically
designed to address the effects of the extended right of rescission.
Section 1640(c) of the Act protects creditors from a borrower's
rescission right if the lender's mis-disclosure was an "unintentional
violation."133 More specifically, this safe harbor provision states that a
creditor will not be held liable for certain unintentional disclosure
violations so long as the violation "resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error."1 3 4
In one case, the court discussed how the lender-defendant had
satisfied the preventative measures necessary for a section 1640(c)
defense to a disclosure violation. In the case of In re Gordon,'35 the
creditor failed to disclose in writing the annual percentage rate for the
borrower's loan.136  The court relied on the creditor's in-house
procedures for completing a borrower's loan documents to test whether
the lender had a defense to its disclosure violation.13 7 The court noted
that the creditor employed trained individuals to complete the loan
documents, that the creditor's employees reviewed completed documents
with borrowers, and that a supervisor reviewed finalized documents for
132. For an excellent discussion of the various statutory defenses available to lenders
for TILA disclosure violations, see generally RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 517-34.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (2006).
134. Id.
135. Gordon v. Hendricks-Patton Co. (In re Gordon), 389 B.R. 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
2008).
136. Id. at 245.
137. Id. at 249.
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errors.138  The court stated that the creditor had satisfied the section
1640(c) defense because the disclosure error was most likely an
unintentional oversight, and because the creditor had procedures in place
that were "reasonably adapted to avoid the errors."13 9
The In re Gordon case illustrates that the requirements for a lender
to invoke a section 1640(c) defense are not terribly onerous. In fact,
many honest lenders who simply employ a closing agent with a
reasonable set of procedures in place for proofreading a loan's closing
documents will satisfy the elements of the defense. 140 This defense is
just one example of the many ways in which Congress has taken steps to
balance the lender's interests with the Act's underlying goal of
empowering borrowers to make informed credit decisions.
2. Conditional Rescission
Another way that Congress has provided protective measures for
lenders is by statutorily authorizing courts to condition loan rescission on
the borrower's tender of the loan principal. Recall that TILA and
Regulation Z provide for a three-step process to occur when a borrower
exercises the right of rescission.141 Under this process, once a borrower
rescinds the loan, the security interest in the borrower's home is
voided. 14 2 After this initial step, the lender has twenty days to refund any
monies paid by the borrower and to reflect the termination of the
underlying security interest in the home.14 3 The third and final step calls
for the borrower to tender back to the lender the loan principal.144 As
written, this process creates a situation in which a borrower can
effectively void the security interest underlying a mortgage, and then
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Groat v. Carlson (In re Groat), 369 B.R. 413 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007). In
the case of In re Groat, the lender's closing agent had inserted the wrong expiration date
of the borrower's rescission right on the Notice of Right to Rescind. Id. at 417. The
court's decision indicated that even if the borrower had successfully invoked the
extended right of rescission, the lender would not be liable for the alleged disclosure
violation due to TILA's section 1640(c) defense. Id. at 418-19. The court relied on the
lender's attorney's procedures for loan closings as evidence of the bona fide error. Id. at
418. The court noted that the attorney's trained assistant would prepare loan documents,
the attorney himself would then proofread the completed documents, and then either the
attorney or his assistant would review the documents with the borrower. Id. The court
noted that the lender had satisfied the section 1640(c) defense because the error was most
likely an unintentional oversight, and because the lender's attorney had procedures in
place that "were reasonably adapted to avoid the error." Id.
141. See supra Part II.E.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(1), 226.23(d)(1) (2009).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(2), 226.23(d)(2).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(3), 226.23(d)(3).
2010] 201
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
walk away from the obligation to tender the loan proceeds back to the
lender.14 5 Obviously this can create a significant risk to the lender who,
now essentially an unsecured creditor, would have little chance of
collecting its loan proceeds from a borrower who then files for
bankruptcy after rescinding the loan.146  To address this potentially
inequitable situation, Regulation Z authorizes a court to alter the
mechanics of the rescission process as a means of balancing the equities
of the case. 14 7
Courts frequently invoke this equitable power to condition a
borrower's loan rescission on the borrower's tender of the loan proceeds
back to the lender.148 That is, the court will not recognize the voiding of
the creditor's security interest until the borrower has paid back the loan
principal to the creditor. These courts reason that the goal of returning
the parties to the status quo ante 4 9 demands that a borrower not receive a
windfall at the expense of imposing an inequitably harsh result on the
lender.150 Accordingly, the majority of courts today will not recognize a
borrower's exercise of the extended right of rescission unless and until
the borrower pays the loan proceeds back to the lender or shows proof of
the ability to do so.151
While there is considerable debate as to whether or not courts are
overstepping their statutory authority when they utilize this conditional
rescission procedure,152 the fact remains that this judicial trend provides
creditors with significant protection from the potential inequities
associated with TILA rescission. Because a court has the right to
scrutinize each TILA rescission case to ensure that the lender is repaid its
loan principal, lenders are not likely to receive an overly harsh result.15 3
In fact, this judicial imposition ensures that, in the end, rescission will
create the precise result that Congress intended: a culpable-lender will
145. See Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976).
146. Cf Ramirez v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Ramirez), 329 B.R. 727, 740 (D.
Kan. 2005); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(4), 226.23(d)(4).
148. See generally Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1171-73.
149. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., American Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 820 (4th
Cir. 2007).
151. In re Ramirez, 329 B.R. at 740.
152. See generally Griffith, supra note 19, at 226-232; RENUART ET AL., supra note
14, at 452-59. Many consumer advocates might scoff at the idea of conceding that courts
have the equitable authority to mandate conditional rescission. But the issue is moot if
the borrower cannot get his or her foot in the door by surviving summary judgment for a
so-called technical violation. Overcoming this initial obstacle requires a strict liability
enforcement standard. See infra note 187.
153. See Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1173 ("Whether the call [for conditional rescission]
is correct must be determined on a case-by-case basis, in light of the record adduced.").
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lose all the interest and fees associated with a noncompliant loan, but
will not lose its entire investment. 154 This result provides lenders with a
powerful incentive to comply with the Act, but does not create the kind
of significant threat to the lending industry that TILA's various
amendments were meant to address. 55 Conditional rescission is another
example of the many steps Congress has taken to balance the lender's
interests with TILA's consumer protection goals.
D. TILA Policy: Implied Means and Explicit Ends
Even if one were to presume that the purpose and reach of the 1995
amendments to TILA were ambiguous, and that TILA's various lender
defenses did not provide adequate protection to lenders, TILA's policy
underpinnings and enforcement framework provide ample guidance on
how courts should handle disclosure violations. As discussed, the
underlying goal of TILA is to allow borrowers to make informed credit
decisions, and Congress chose to effectuate this goal by requiring that
lenders provide borrowers with specific, uniform loan disclosures. 56
Additionally, Congress created a specific enforcement structure to carry
out the goals of the Act. For example, under TILA, consumer-borrowers
are empowered to act as "private attorneys general" to enforce the Act's
provisions. 157 Moreover, TILA not only provides monetary damages to
those borrowers who prove a lender's violation, it also avails borrowers
with the powerful remedy of rescission for certain violations. This
enforcement framework shows that a lender's only incentive to comply
with TILA's disclosure provisions is avoidance of the statutory penalties
for noncompliance. 1 59 Thus, Congress has shown that deterrence is the
154. See Quenzer v. Advanta Mortgage Corp. USA, 288 B.R. 884, 889 (D. Kan.
2003); see generally supra Part IIE-F.
155. See Quenzer, 288 B.R. at 889.
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2009); see generally
Mourning v. Family Publ'n Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 360-70 (1973) (discussing the
purpose of TILA); RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 1-3.
157. See, e.g., Perrone v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 232 F.3d 433, 436 (5th
Cir. 2000) ("The caselaw confirms that statutory damages may be imposed as a means to
encourage private attorneys general to police disclosure compliance even where no actual
damages exist."); Jones v. TransOhio Say. Ass'n, 747 F.2d 1037, 1040 (11th Cir. 1984).
However, TILA also grants enforcement authority to certain federal agencies. See 15
U.S.C. § 1607(a).
158. See generally supra note 40 and accompanying text.
159. See McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 426 (1st Cir.
2007); cf Griffith, supra note 19, at 232 (discussing the importance of courts' strict
application of TILA's provisions, as "any coddling of creditors removes the incentive for
creditors to respond to statutory demands").
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implied means for ensuring lender compliance. 160 This use of compelled
lender compliance in turn effectuates TILA's underlying goal of
empowering borrowers to make informed credit decisions through the
standardization of loan disclosures.' 6'
Congress likely chose this combination of consumer oversight and
lender deterrence as the enforcement framework for TILA because of the
disparities that exist between most consumers and their lenders.
Consider the obvious disadvantages that the average consumer-borrower
encounters when sitting across the settlement table from a sophisticated
lender or mortgage broker. At a typical home-refinance closing a
borrower will receive dozens, and possibly hundreds, of documents
throughout a proceeding that may only last an hour.162 During this brief
period of time, the borrower is expected to sign or acknowledge a
number of documents, including the various TILA disclosures. 163
Although the TILA disclosures are designed to be readily
understandable, they are "notorious for confusing people."' 64 When an
unsophisticated and trusting borrower is thrust into the rushed
atmosphere of a typical real estate loan refinance closing, it is easy to
imagine how the essential terms of the loan can get lost in a sea of
paper. 165
160. See, e.g., Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The
remedial scheme in the TIL[A] Act is designed to deter generally illegalities ... and not
just to compensate borrowers for their actual injuries in any particular case."); see also
Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 399 (6th Cir. 1980) ("The clear
purpose of this statutorily mandated minimum recovery was to encourage lawsuits by
individual consumers as a means of enforcing creditor compliance with the Act.").
161. See, e.g., Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Only
adherence to a strict compliance standard will promote the standardization of terms which
will permit consumers readily to make meaningful comparisons of available credit
alternatives.").
162. See, e.g., Bob Tedeschi, Simplification: A Complex Job, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2007, at REl l; Jay Romano, Paper, Paper And Even More Paper, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2001, at RE5; see also, HomeBanc Mortgage Corporation Case Study, available at
http://www.onbase.com/English/IndustrySolutions/FinancialServices/CaseStudies/Home
Banc (last visited January 1, 2010) (stating that HomeBanc's average loan file for a
residential mortgage is approximately 300 pages).
163. See Tedeschi, supra note 162. One court noted that a mortgage closing "requires
a strong wrist and a good pen to sign a bevy of forms and documents." Handy v. Anchor
Mortgage Corp., 464 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2006).
164. Tedeschi, supra note 162; see Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime
"HEL" Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the
Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473, 544 (2000) (stating that the
information contained in the TILA disclosures is "complex and probably
incomprehensible to most subprime borrowers").
165. See Interview by Neil Cavuto with Michael Shea, Executive Director, Acorn
Housing Corp., on Fox News' Your World with Neil Cavuto (Oct. 13, 2008), available at
2008 WLNR 19503519 (stating that the vast majority of borrowers do not read the
documents they sign during a mortgage closing).
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Congress decided that, under the circumstances, the best way to
communicate to a borrower the most basic aspects of a loan transaction is
to require lenders to provide a short list of important disclosures.' 66
Moreover, Congress took painstaking efforts to identify the precise
requirements associated with these disclosures, including what
information is to be included and in what form the information is to be
documented. 167 Although these disclosures surely do not guarantee the
borrower fully understands the nature and extent of the prospective credit
decision, they at least increase the probability of an informed decision.16 8
Also, Congress most likely recognized that the "burdens imposed on
creditors are minimal, especially when compared to the harms that are
avoided." 69 So when a court decides that the absence or misstatement of
these statutorily-required, basic details of the loan transaction seem too
technical to be a violation, the court is truly placing the borrower on
"unequal footing" 7 0 with a far more experienced, knowledgeable
lender. '7  Over time, the use of a less-than-strict liability standard for
enforcing TILA violations can have negative practical implications for
both consumers and for the effectiveness of the Act as a consumer
protection statute.
E. Practical Consequences
A court's lax enforcement of TILA's disclosure requirements can
create a number of practical negative consequences. The most obvious
effect is that the application of a less-than-strict liability standard
weakens the extended right of rescission as a defense to foreclosure. But
there are other, related consequences of a soft judicial enforcement
regime.
166. See generally supra notes 31, 40 and accompanying text.
167. See generally supra notes 31, 40.
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). But see, Mansfield, supra note 164, at 544
(stating that the TILA disclosures do not benefit most borrowers in making an informed
credit decision because "the information is not given to the borrower until the loan
closing").
169. Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994).
170. Taylor v. United Mgmt., Inc., 51 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1215 (D.N.M. 1999).
171. See Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Semar v. Platte
Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1986)) (noting that
Congress, in enacting TILA, recognized that consumers are "inherently at a disadvantage
in loan and credit transactions"); Bizier v. Globe Fin. Serv., Inc. 654 F.2d 1, 3 (C.A.
Mass. 1981) (noting that TILA was "intended to balance scales thought to be weighed in
favor of lenders").
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1. Weakening the Foreclosure Defense
The application of a less-than-strict liability standard for TILA
violations weakens the potency of the Act's extended right of rescission
as a defense to foreclosure. As discussed, Congress's strategic
adjustment of TILA's tolerance standards in the 1995 amendments
highlighted Congress's desire to make the extended right of rescission
particularly accessible to borrowers facing foreclosure.172 Congress most
likely recognized that some borrowers may attempt to exploit minor,
accidental mistakes by honest lenders as a means of reneging on a
loan.'73 Accordingly, TILA provides various lender-defenses for certain
disclosure violations.174 But if a lender has no defense for its violation, a
court is expected to honor the borrower's statutory right to raise the
extended right of rescission as a shield against a noncompliant lender's
foreclosure proceedings. To do otherwise weakens the Act's ability to
deter lender noncompliance, which is the foundation of TILA's
enforcement framework. 75
If the deterrent effect of the extended right of rescission becomes
impotent due to courts' lax enforcement regimes, then borrowers may
find that they are unable to pursue their claims in court. Rather,
borrowers might find out through a cursory summary judgment that their
lenders' disclosure violations were not severe enough to allow them to
invoke their statutorily-defined rights.'76 The end result is that borrowers
will find it increasingly difficult to raise the extended right to rescission
as a defense to foreclosure.
2. Invitation for Predatory Lending
Weak enforcement of TILA disclosure requirements can also create
an invitation for purposeful noncompliance and predatory lending
practices. The contribution of predatory lending to the subprime credit
crisis is well-documented, 7 as is the manner in which unscrupulous
172. See supra Part II.F.
173. In support of the initial moratorium on TILA class action suits, Sen. Mack stated
that in the state of Florida banners had been hung encouraging borrowers to rescind their
loans and that attorneys were amassing large numbers of plaintiffs in response to the
Rodash decision. 141 CONG. REc. S5614-02, (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1995), available at 1995
WL 236489; see also McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418,
426 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that some attorneys actively recruit potential TILA plaintiffs
by creating advertisements that hold out the prospect of recoveries, and that this can
create "a powerful incentive" for certain debtors).
174. See supra Part III.C.
175. See supra Part III.D.
176. See, e.g., Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 313 (1st Cir. 2009).
177. See generally MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note I, passim.
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lenders cheated borrowers by obfuscating the true interest rate, monthly
payments, and other terms of home-refinance loans.178  TILA's
disclosure requirements can be a weapon to combat the incidence of
predatory lending, as they force lenders to disclose enough information
about a loan to give the borrower one last opportunity before loan
consummation to assess the affordability of loan payments. 179
When courts apply a less-than-strict liability standard to TILA
disclosure violations, however, they announce to the entire lending
industry that lenders can get away with a bit of fudging of TILA's
disclosures, so long as the violation is deemed sufficiently technical and
occurs in the right Circuit. This blurring of TILA law creates confusion
among honest lenders who seek guidance for complying with the Act,
while also alerting unscrupulous lenders to new ways to take advantage
of borrowers while escaping liability.180 This obviously increases the
risk that borrowers can be tricked into loans that they cannot afford,
which recent history has proven is an excellent recipe for widespread
loan defaults and accompanying home foreclosures.
3. Discouragement of Private Settlements
A court's application of a less-than-strict liability standard to TILA
violations has the effect of discouraging private negotiations between
noncompliant lenders and their borrowers. TILA's extended right of
rescission is meant to be a private remedy that encourages disclosure
violations to be "worked out between creditor and debtor without the
intervention of the courts."181  Obviously a lender has an incentive to
settle a valid rescission claim through either a loan refinance or loan
modification, as this will likely result in a less costly outcome than if the
lender is subject to loan rescission.
This incentive becomes less obvious, however, when lenders see
that borrowers who attempt rescission are unable to survive summary
judgment for anything less than flagrant TILA violations.182 Under these
circumstances, a lender will likely feel less compelled to negotiate a
mutually-beneficial settlement with a borrower who has threatened to
178. See generally id. passim.
179. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 160 1(a) (2006) (stating that the purpose of TILA is to "avoid the
uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair
credit ... practices").
180. But whether honest or unscrupulous, most lenders will only disclose the minimal
amount of information necessary to avoid a lawsuit. See Elwin Griffith, Searching for
the Truth in Lending: Identifying Some Problems in the Truth and Lending Act and
Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 265, 351 (2000).
181. Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17,25 (1st Cir. 2005).
182. See supra Part III.A.
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rescind. In fact, when lenders consider certain courts' lax enforcement
standards, coupled with the widespread judicial use of conditional
rescission, 83 they typically take the position of either ignoring a
borrower's rescission notice, denying a violation ever occurred, or
both. 184
Conversely, the application of a traditional strict liability standard to
TILA violations has the effect of encouraging private settlements, while
still allowing courts to prevent inequitable outcomes. The use of a strict
liability judicial enforcement regime will give notice to lenders that the
only thing standing between a disclosure violation and a court-imposed
interest-free loan is the ability of a borrower to tender the loan principal.
Lenders will have a clear incentive to not only avoid disclosure
violations, but also to find a non-rescission solution when a violation
occurs. Of course, in the event that the borrower's asserted rescission is
not based on a true violation, the lender can rely on the courts to ensure a
fair outcome. Thus, even if courts apply strict liability to TILA
violations, lenders need not fear the potential inequitable outcome
associated with a borrower's attempt at a rescission-bankruptcy two-
step. 185
In the end, lenders will face the threat of the precise punishment
intended by Congress: the loss of interest income on a noncompliant
loan. 186 This threat is harsh enough to ensure compliance by encouraging
the standardization of loan disclosures, but is not harsh enough to
threaten the solvency of the lending industry.'87  This outcome deters
183. See supra Part III.C.
184. RENUART ET AL., supra note 14, at 452.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
186. See supra text accompanying note 154; see also Part IIE.
187. See supra text accompanying note 155. The lending industry should not be
concerned about the prospect of widespread loan rescissions accompanying strict liability
enforcement of TILA. Even if a strict liability enforcement regime were to cause an
avalanche of rescission claims, many borrowers would not be able to comply with the
tender requirements for conditional rescission. Most borrowers in default would likely
encounter great difficulty in acquiring the funds necessary to tender the loan principal
back to the lender, as a borrower in default presumably has little savings and poor credit
resulting from the default. While this results in a terribly unfortunate outcome for many
borrowers, the fact remains that lenders need not fear that the use of a strict liability
standard will pose a serious threat to the lending industry. However, a strict liability
standard will force lenders to decide if they are willing to take a chance on a particular
rescission claim being brought by a borrower who does in fact have the means to tender,
in which case the lender will be subject to the full consequences of rescission. Thus, the
use of strict liability will, at the very least, place borrowers in a stronger position to
negotiate than they are now. Moreover, borrowers who choose to pursue their rescission
claims in court can avoid being subject to a quick summary judgment decision for a so-
called technical violation.
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lender noncompliance, promotes the informed use of credit, and ensures
equitable results. This is the outcome Congress desired.
IV. CONCLUSION
TILA has traditionally been considered a strict liability statute.
Those courts that apply a less-than-strict liability standard to TILA
disclosure violations reason that the extended right of rescission imposes
an overly harsh, inequitable result on lenders, and therefore this remedy
should not be permitted for so-called technical violations of the Act's
disclosure requirements. These courts misconstrue the language and
purpose of TILA's 1995 amendments, which were meant to address the
risk of a particular type of class action rescission suit, and to emphasize
the importance of the extended right of rescission for borrowers facing
foreclosure. Additionally, these courts overlook TILA's built-in lender
protections, including various statutory lender defenses and the courts'
statutory authority to condition rescission on a borrower's ability to pay
the lender back the loan principal.
Lax judicial enforcement of TILA disclosure violations threatens
the efficacy of the Act as a consumer protection statute. Congress
decided that the best way to increase borrowers' informed use of credit is
by requiring lenders to uniformly supply borrowers with the most basic
details of a loan's terms and costs. Congress took painstaking efforts to
identify the precise details required for each loan disclosure and gave
borrowers the power of private enforcement. Thus, when courts take it
upon themselves to allow lenders to escape liability for disclosure
violations, they are threatening the foundation of the Act's enforcement
framework.
Without the powerful combination of strict liability enforcement
and the extended right of rescission remedy, lenders have far less
incentive to comply with the Act. This can serve as an invitation for
predatory lending, which in turn increases the risk of loan defaults and
foreclosures. Moreover, a less-than-strict liability enforcement standard
discourages private settlements between lenders and borrowers, as
lenders have far less incentive to negotiate with a borrower when they
know that a court will simply ignore certain disclosure violations. When
courts apply a soft enforcement standard to TILA disclosure violations,
borrowers also frequently find that they are unable to survive summary
judgment for a claim against their statutorily-culpable lender.
Consequently, many borrowers are unable to invoke the extended right
of rescission when facing home foreclosure, even though Congress made
special efforts to increase access to this remedy for this unfortunate
group of consumers.
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In a dire economic atmosphere where predatory lending has
contributed to widespread home foreclosures, courts should not take it
upon themselves to speculate on alternative theories of congressional
intent, especially when the purpose, history, and letter of the law are so
clear. The application of a less-than-strict liability standard to TILA
disclosure violations undermines the foundation of the Act, which is
meant to empower consumer-borrowers to see that lenders comply with
TILA's disclosure mandates, which in turn allows borrowers to make
informed credit decisions. Strict enforcement of TILA's disclosure
mandates is the best way to ensure that gradual, but widespread lender
noncompliance will be avoided.
Put another way, when Congress enacted TILA, it made a conscious
decision to effectuate the goals of the Act by offering lenders all-stick-
and-no-carrot. Thus, the sting of the stick must remain fierce.
